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This paper extends the two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin model of  a small 
open economy in which capital is sector-specific  in the short run to allow 
for labor-market disequilibrium caused by transitional wage stickiness. 
The  implications for the stability and speed of convergence toward a new 
long-run equilibrium following an exogeneous change in the terms of 
trade are examined, and conditions are derived under which “immiseri- 
zing  reallocation”  can  occur  during  the  adjustment  period.  The 
framework presented is used to suggest appropriate measures of adjust- 
ment costs and to reconcile recent discussions of  the welfare-theoretic 
case for adjustment assistance. 
3.1  Introduction 
There seems to be little doubt that many of the most vocal pleas for 
adjustment assistance are nothing more than old protectionism in new 
bottles: the prospect of increased low-cost imports from newly industrial- 
ized countries is frequently a convenient excuse for providing declining 
industries with assistance which has little justification from the viewpoint 
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of  comparative advantage.  At  the same time the liberal economist’s 
instinctive suspicion of  such intervention should not be allowed to rule 
out the possibility that it may on occasions be given some theoretical 
justification over and above its undoubted tactical value in sugaring the 
pill of tariff reductions. 
The object of the present paper is to attempt to examine some of  the 
issues raised  by  the adjustment-assistance debate in  the  light of  the 
positive and normative theory of international trade. As we shall see, the 
normative prescriptions of this body of theory are, in principle, relatively 
straightforward,  but their  application in  any individual case depends 
crucially on the assumptions made about the behavior and institutional 
environment of  the private sector. Section 3.2 of  the paper therefore 
begins by reviewing the implications of  one set of  assumptions regarding 
the medium-run adjustment of the standard two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin 
model of  a small open economy. This approach, which assumes that 
capital is a fixed factor in the short run, but moves between sectors in the 
medium run in response to intersectoral differences in rentals, has been 
extensively examined in  recent work by  Mayer (1974), Mussa (1974, 
1978), Jones  (1975), Kemp, Kimura,  and Okuguchi (1977), and the 
author (1978a, b) among others. Section 3.3 proceeds to extend this 
literature by  relaxing the assumption made in  earlier papers that full 
employment of labor is maintained throughout the adjustment period by 
instantaneous wage flexibility. When this assumption is dropped, the 
labor market as well as the capital market is out of equilibrium during the 
adjustment period, and the consequences of this for the path followed by 
the economy are examined. 
The model of section 3.3 is then applied in section 3.4 to the question of 
the appropriate measure of adjustment costs, both private and social, and 
it is shown that national income can fall temporarily during the adjust- 
ment process, a phenomenon which is labeled “immiserizing realloca- 
tion.” Finally section 3.5 takes up the normative issue of the appropriate 
form of  public assistance to the adjustment process, an issue recently 
examined by Lapan (1976) and Mussa (1978). The principal conclusion, 
which is no doubt obvious but still deserves to be stressed, is that the case 
for adjustment assistance is essentially a second-best one. In an otherwise 
undistorted economy where the government is no better informed about 
the future course of the economy than the private sector, there is no case 
on grounds of allocative efficiency for public intervention to supplement 
or counteract private decisions. However, intervention may be justified 
in the presence of  domestic distortions, even if  the private sector has 
perfect foresight of  future returns to capital. Of  course, even when a 
theoretical case for adjustment assistance can  be made,  its practical 
implementation  raises some difficult questions of  political economy, 
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3.2  Short-Run Capital Specificity in the Heckscher-Ohlin Model 
We begin by  reviewing the short-run capital specificity adjustment 
process assuming continual full employment, using a diagrammatic tech- 
nique presented in Neary (1978~)  and reproduced in panels (i) and (iv) of 
figure 3.1. We assume an economy producing two goods, Xand Y,  under 
conditions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale, using two 
inelastically  supplied primary factors of production, capital (K)  and labor 
(L).  Assuming for the present  that  product  and factor  markets are 
undistorted, initial equilibrium in the labor market is determined by the 
intersection of the labor-demand schedules for the two sectors at point A 
in panel (i). This equilibrium is contingent on a particular commodity 
price ratio,  given  exogenously to the economy, and on a particular 
allocation of the capital stock between the sectors. This allocation corre- 
sponds to the solid horizontal line in the Edgeworth-Bowley box, panel 
(iv), and since point a, which is vertically below point A,  lies on the 
efficiency locus of the box, it follows that these two points represent a full, 
or long-run, equilibrium, at which each factor is allocated such that it 
receives the same return in both sectors. 
This initial long-run equilibrium is also represented by  point A ’ in 
panel (ii) of figure 3.1, at the intersection of the isocost curves c,”  and c,,. 
Each of  these curves shows combinations of  the wage rate w and the 
rental rate r which imply a unit cost of  production for the sector in 
question equal to its world price.’ Hence only the factor prices corre- 
sponding to A’ ensure zero profits for both sectors. The slope of  each 
isocost curve at a given point equals the capital-labor ratio in the sector in 
question, so  at A’  sector X is  relatively labor-intensive; this is  also 
indicated, of course, in panel (iv) by the fact that the efficiency locus lies 
below the diagonal of  the Edgeworth-Bowley box. 
Consider now the effects of  an exogenous once-and-for-all fall in the 
world price of X. This shifts that sector’s labor-demand schedule down- 
ward in panel (i) from L: to L:, and shifts its isocost curve inward toward 
the origin in panel (ii) from c$ to c:.  (These two shifts are by  the same 
proportionate amount as the price fall, so that point S, which lies verti- 
cally below A in panel [i], corresponds to the same wage rate as point S’ , 
which lies on the ray from the origin to A’ in panel [ii].) Assuming that 
capital is sector-specific  in the short run and that the wage rate is perfectly 
flexible, the fall in the price of X determines a new short-run equilibrium 
at point B at which the wage rate is lower, and sector Y has expanded, 
availing itself of some of the now-cheaper labor released by the contract- 
ing sector X.  Moreover, it is clear from panel (ii) that the return on capital 
has fallen in sector X and risen in sector Y (to levels represented by the 
points B:  and B;, respectively). Over time, this increased relative attrac- 
tiveness of  renting capital goods to sector Y rather than to sector X may Fig. 3.1 
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be expected to induce an intersectoral reallocation of  the capital stock, 
and for the remainder of  this section we assume that this reallocation 
takes place at a rate determined by the differential equation: 
DK, = +{L-  1)  +’>O,+(O)  = 0, 
‘Y 
(1) 
where D represents the time derivative operator and the capital stock is 
assumed to be always fully employed: 
(2)  K,+K,,=K. 
The adjustment mechanism embodied in equation (1) is ad hoc in at 
least  two  respects.  In  the first place it  considers only the return  to 
reallocating capital, thus implicitly assuming constant costs in the “capi- 
tal-reallocation’’ industry. Second, the return is measured by the differ- 
ence between the current rentals on capital in the two sectors rather than 
by  the difference between the present value of  the stream of  future 
rentals accruing to a unit of capital in each sector; this implicitly assumes 
that capital owners have static expectations of future rental rates. Both of 
these deficiencies are avoided in a recent paper by Mussa (1978) which 
specifies an explicit microeconomic model of  the reallocation decision, 
and also allows for the general-equilibrium feedback onto wages arising 
from the direct use of  labor by the capital-reallocation industry. How- 
ever, the richness of Mussa’s analysis of the capital market precludes his 
examining the consequences of  sluggish adjustment in the labor market, 
with which the present paper (as well as much of the applied literature on 
adjustment assistance) is primarily concerned. Moreover, his own analy- 
sis is ad hoc in some respects: in particular, it assumes  of necessity that the 
marginal cost of  reallocating capital is a nondecreasing function of  the 
rate of reallocation, since otherwise the optimal adjustment policy is of 
the “bang-bang” type, and the economy moves instantaneously to the 
new long-run equilibrium.* For these reasons it seems worthwhile to 
explore the implications of  the simple adjustment mechanism (1). 
As capital moves out of the labor-intensive sector X  into sector Y, the 
resulting fall in the aggregate demand for labor puts downward pressure 
on the wage  rate,  thus inducing a  substitution  toward  more  labor- 
intensive techniques in both sectors. Hence in panel (iv) of figure 3.1 the 
capital reallocation drives the economy away from point b (which lies 
directly below B) along a path on which the capital-labor ratios in both 
sectors are continually falling. Such a path (which must lie in the triangle 
Q,bh) is shown by the solid line bg. The new long-run equilibrium at g is 
also illustrated by point G’ in panel (ii), where the equality of rental rates 
in the two sectors is restored. 
Since our main objective is to investigate the consequences of sluggish 
wage adjustment, it is desirable to illustrate the adjustment process in yet 44  J. Peter Neary 
another manner, which explicitly relates the wage rate to the intersectoral 
allocation of  capital. This is done in panels (iii) and (v) of  figure 3.1 
(where panel [v] simply translates the vertical axis of panel [iv] into the 
horizontal axis of panel [iii]). Point a  in panel (iii) represents the initial 
equilibrium, and the fall in the price of Xcauses an immediate fall in the 
wage rate, moving the equlibrium to point p. Over time the reallocation 
of capital causes a southwesterly movement of  the equilibrium point in 
panel (iii), as the wage rate drifts downward and the proportion of  the 
capital stock employed in sector X steadily falls. The economy therefore 
follows the path py, which corresponds exactly to the path bg in panel 
(iv), until eventually the new long-run equilibrium at y is attained. 
The different panels of  figure 3.1 thus illustrate from a number of 
perspectives the short-run capital specificity adjustment hypothesis with 
continual full employment, whose properties are familiar from earlier 
writings: the initial fall in the price of X lowers the wage rate and brings 
about a rental differential in favor of sector Y.  Over time this induces an 
intersectoral capital flow, and both factor prices and factor allocations 
move monotonically toward their new long-run equilibrium levels which, 
as predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, exhibit a fall in the wage 
rate and a rise in the rental rate (now equalized between the two sectors) 
relative to both commodity prices. We turn therefore in the next section 
to examine how this picture is affected when we abandon the assumption 
of  rapid adjustment of  wages. 
3.3  Short-Run Capital Specificity with Sticky Wages 
Strictly speaking, the model outlined in the previous section assumed 
not  that the wage adjusts instantaneously,  but  merely that it  moves 
sufficiently rapidly to restore labor-market equilibrium before capital 
begins to move between sectors. Previous writers have not made explicit 
the mechanism by which this equilibrium is brought about, but it seems 
natural to assume that it involves a positive relationship between wage 
changes and the level of  excess demand for labor: 
Ld  Dw  = * {y  -  1)  +'>0,+(0) = 0, 
L 
where Ld  is the demand for labor by  both sectors and  is the fixed 
aggregate labor  supply. Note that, according to equation (3), excess 
demand for and excess supply of labor affect the wage rate in a symmetric 
fashion. Without specifying the microeconomic underpinnings of  (3) in 
greater detail, this seems a reasonable simplification, especially since we 
are primarily interested in  the qualitative general-equilibrium conse- 
quences of  labor-market disequilibrium. 
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Suppose now that the speed of adjustment implied by the $ (.)  function 
in equation (3) is not instantaneous relative to that embodied in the +  (.) 
function in equation (1).  This means that both labor and capital markets 
may be simultaneously out of  long-run equilibrium. Assuming that the 
wage rate is fixed in the short run in terms of good Y,  the impact effect of 
the fall in the price of Xis  therefore that sector Xlays off EA workers (in 
panel [i] of  figure 3.1) which  sector Y has no incentive to hire. The 
resulting unemployment of  EA causes the wage rate to drift downward 
over time while at the same time capital begins to reallocate out of sector 
X in response to the induced rental differential (represented in panel [ii] 
by the gap between the rental in X at E’ and that in Y at A’).  Hence the 
economy moves away from point  cx  in panel  (iii) in  a southwesterly 
direction. But now, by  contrast with the full-employment case of  the 
previous section, the time paths of  factor prices and factor allocations 
need  not  be monotonic.  The economy may  overshoot  the long-run 
equilibrium pointy, in which case, when the wage falls below its long-run 
equilibrium level, the rental differential moves in favor of sector Xand so 
the direction of  intersectoral capital movement is reversed. The path 
followed by the economy is thus a counterclockwise spiral in panel (iii), 
which must bring it into the region of excess demand for labor below the 
labor-market equilibrium locus yf3. Within this region firms are frustrated 
in their efforts to hire labor, and so their output levels are determined by 
their “effective” demand for labor z rather than their “notional” de- 
mand Ld.  As we shall see below, this has a number of implications for the 
behavior of the economy when excess demand for labor prevails. How- 
ever, it does not affect the qualitative nature of the adjustment path, and 
so the dynamic evolution of  the economy is governed by the arrows in 
panel (iii). 
Is there any guarantee that the economy will converge toward the new 
long-run equilibrium at y? In order to investigate this we examine the 
local stability of  the model, for which it is necessary to derive algebraic 
expressions for the two stationary loci in the neighborhood of y. Consider 
first the capital-market equilibrium locus, the stationary locus of  (1). An 
expression for this in differential form may be derived by manipulating 
the price-equal-to-unit-cost equations, which reflect the fact that under 
competition the proportional change in the price of each sector’s output 
must be a weighted average of  changes in the returns to the factors 
employed there, where the relevant weights (the 8,)  are the shares of 
each factor in the value of  the sector’s output: 46  J. Peter Neary 
(A circumflex over a variable indicates a proportional rate of  change: 
1.9  = d log w.)  Manipulating (4)  and (5)  yields 
A"  r, -  ry - 
where 101,  which equals el, -  OlY, is the determinant of the matrix of value 
shares, and is positive if and only if sector Xis  relatively labor-intensive in 
value terms. Note that from equation (6) the intersectoral rental differen- 
tial does not depend on K,: with a fured wage the capital market is not 
self-equilibrating. Hence with a fixed wage rate and fixed commodity 
prices the allocation of capital between sectors is either indeterminate (in 
the knife-edge case where the wage happens to equal its long-run equilib- 
rium value) or else the economy is driven to ~pecialize.~ 
In the present model, however, the wage is sticky rather than fixed and 
its dynamic evolution is governed by equation (3). To analyze this case, 
we note that the aggregate demand for labor equals the sum of the labor 
demands from each sector, each of  which in turn equals the sector's unit 
labor requirement aij times its output level: 
(7) 
The levels of  output themselves equal the available stock of  capital in 
each sector divided by the sector's unit capital requirement akj: 
L~ = al,x + aly  Y. 
(8)  x=  Kxlah,  Y=  Kylaky. 
Totally differentiating (7) and (8) yields 
(9)  id  = hlx(blx -  bkx + k,) +  A,,  (illy -  bky + ky  ) , 
where A, is the proportion of the demand for labor which emanates from 
sector j.  Assuming that neither sector is rationed in the labor market, 
equation (9) may be expressed in terms of  factor prices by invoking the 
definition of  the elasticity of  factor substitution: 
A1 
(10)  b  ri -4kjzLj-K.  J  = -Uj(6J-?j)  G=X,y) 
- --  - 
kj 
(The step from [lo]  to [ll]  makes use of equations [4] and [5].) Moreover 
the changes in sectoral capital stocks in (9) may be related by  recalling 
that they must satisfy the full-employment constraint for capital, (2), 
which may be written in differential form as 
Substituting from (11) and (12) into (9) yields an expression in differen- 
tial form for the aggregate demand for labor as a function of changes in 
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(13) 
where A, the wage elasticity of the aggregate labor-demand schedule, is a 
weighted average of  the corresponding elasticities in each sector: 
and  where  IXI,  which equals  XFXky 7  Xlyhkx,  the determinant of  the 
matrix of factor-to-sector allocations, is positive if  and only if  sector X is 
relatively labor-intensive in physical terms. Equation (13) shows that the 
aggregate demand for labor falls with a rise in the wage rate (so that the 
labor market is stable in isolation) and rises with a rise in the relative price 
of X  (the good in terms of which the wage rate is nol pegged) or with an 
increase in the proportion of  the capital stock employed in the labor- 
intensive sector. 
We are now in a position to examine the local stability of  the model. 
Linearizing equations (1) and (3) around a long-run equilibrium point 





where E+ and E, are multiples of the slopes of the adjustment functions 
(1) and (3) (e.g., E+ = +'rx/ry) and so are measures of  the speed of 
adjustment of the capital and labor markets, respectively. It is clear that 
the trace of  the matrix is negative provided techniques are variable in at 
least one sector (so that A is nonzero). Therefore a necessary and suf- 
ficient condition for local stability of the system (15) is that the determi- 
nant  of  the coefficient matrix  be  positive.  This is equivalent  to the 
condition 
(16)  IXI iei > 0, 
i.e., that the value and physical rankings of the relative factor intensities 
of  the two sectors coincide at a point of  long-run equilibri~m.~ 
This condition, which is the same as that derived in Neary (19783) 
under the assumption of  continual full employment, is automatically 
fulfilled if  there are no permanent factor-market distortions. Hence we 
may conclude that, at least for small displacements of the initial equilib- 
rium, the model converges in a stable fashion toward the new long-run 48  J. Peter Neary 
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Fig. 3.2 
equilibrium point y in panel (iii) of  figure 3.1. A similar phase diagram 
may be devised for the case where sector X  is relatively capital-intensive, 
and it is illustrated in figure 3.2.  The path followed by the economy is now 
a clockwise loop in  (Kx,  w)  space, and since the price of  the capital- 
intensive good has  fallen,  the wage rate  must  rise in  the long run. 
(Compare points ci and y.) But in other respects the medium-run adjust- 
ment of the economy is qualitatively similar to that in figure 3.1. Only if 
there are permanent factor-market distortions can any problem of insta- 
bility arise. Such a case is illustrated in figure 3.3, where sector X  is 
relatively capital-intensive in the physical sense but has to pay relatively 
more for labor than for capital by  comparison with sector Y,  with the 
result that  at the long-run equilibrium point  y  sector X  is relatively 
labor-intensive in the value sense. Hence that equilibrium is a saddle 
point: unless the economy lies initially on the dashed line through y it is 
driven to specialize in one of  the two goods. This finding reinforces the 
conclusions of Neary (19783), where it was argued that stability consid- 
erations  render  implausible the  many  comparative-statics paradoxes 
associated with the nonfulfillment of  condition (16). 49  Capital Mobility, Wage Stickiness, and Adjustment Assistance 
Fig. 3.3 
Returning to the stable case, an explicit calculation of the characteristic 
roots of  the coefficient matrix in (15) yields 
It is clear that convergence is more rapid, and cycles are less likely, the 
greater the potential for factor substitution in either sector, and so the 
greater the aggregate elasticity of demand for labor. In the extreme case 
of fixed coefficients in both sectors, the demand for labor is independent 
of the wage rate. The characteristic roots (17) now have no real parts, and 
so if  both adjustment mechanisms (1) and (3) continue to operate, the 
economy remains in a limit cycle, as shown in figure 3.4. By contrast, if  A 
is relatively large, the value of the wage rate which equilibrates the labor 
market is sensitive to the allocation of  the capital stock, and so conver- 
gence is likely to be rapid and monotonic, as figure 3.5 illustrates. 
The preceding analysis is strictly applicable only when there is unem- 
ployment or when the economy is in the neighborhood of  a long-run 




prevails, equations (4),  (5), and (10) do not necessarily hold, because if 
the aggregate demand for labor exceeds the supply, some firms must be 
rationed in the labor market, which leads them to produce at a point 
where the marginal product of  labor is not equated to the real wage. 
Hence in the preceding derivations the “notional” factor demand sched- 
ules and equilibrium loci, which implicitly assume that no rationing takes 
place, must be replaced by their “effective” counterparts, in the manner 
which  is  becoming familiar  from  the  literature  on  “disequilibrium” 
macroeconomics.5  The details of this procedure are set out in appendix B, 
where  it  is shown that, when excess demand for labor prevails,  the 
notional capital-market equilibrium locus (6) is displaced to an extent 
which depends on the rationing rule for allocating labor between the two 
sectors. The resulting effective loci are shown as dashed lines in figures 
3.2,3.3,3.5,  and 3.7,  and it is clear that they do not affect the qualitative 
conclusions about the behavior of  the economy drawn above. 
Before concluding this section, we may note that it has been assumed 
throughout that it is the wage rate expressed in terms of  good Y which is 
sticky in response to excess demand or supply in the labor market. This 
asymmetric assumption is not inappropriate when we are concerned with 51  Capital Mobility, Wage Stickiness, and Adjustment Assistance 
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the consequences of a fall in the price of X, and in any case the analysis is 
not substantially dependent on it. More generally, we may assume that it 
is the real wage in the sense of  the utility level of wage earners which is 
fixed in the short run and which responds sluggishly to labor-market 
disequilibrium. Formally, this may be expressed by equating the nominal 
wage w to the nominal expenditure of  the representative wage earner, 
which is a function of both commodity prices and the wage earner’s utility 
level u: 
(18)  w =  JqPx,Py,4. 
(19) 
Totally differentiating (18) yields 
pi2 = $J -  tpx  -  (1 -  @py, 
where p is the utility elasticity of expenditure and 5  is the budget share of 
good X.  The analysis of this section now goes through almost unchanged 
provided u is substituted for w in equations (3) to (15); the only qualifica- 
tion is that if real wages are sticky in terms of goodX(i.e., 5  = l),  a fall in 
the price of X does not give rise to unemployment in the short run. 52  J. Peter Neary 
3.4  Measuring the Costs of Adjustment 
So  far we  have examined the consequences of  sluggish wage adjust- 
ment from the perspective of  the factor markets. However, in order to 
quantify the costs of adjustment under alternative assumptions about the 
medium-run evolution of the economy, it is desirable to recast the analy- 
sis in output space. 
In figure 3.6 the initial equilibrium point Ar  corresponds to the initial 
equilibrium in figure 3.1, with the additional assumption that X  is the 
import good so that initial consumption is at C,. Following the fall in the 
world price of X,  the new long-run equilibrium production point is  G” 
with consumption at C,,  which lies on the income-consumption curve 
ICC corresponding to the new world price ratio. At the new long-run 
equilibrium, the level of  national income measured in units of  Y equals 
the distance  ON, which  therefore provides a benchmark with which 
national income at any intermediate production point may be compared. 
For example, if  production were to remain at A’  in the short run:  the 
improvement in the terms of trade would still yield a consumption gain of 
HJ but national income would fall short of  its long-run potential by the 
amount JN. Hence under the assumptions of  given world prices and no 
long-run domestic distortions, a true welfare-theoretic measure of  the 
“costs of adjustment” along a given adjustment path is the present value 
of the stream of all such shortfalls of output below its long-run level ON.’ 
Consider now the adjustment path under the short-run capital specific- 
ity hypothesis with continual full employment. As noted by Mayer (1974) 
the economy is initially constrained by a short-run transformation curve 
such as T‘T‘ which lies inside the long-run curve TT,  and so production 
moves following the price change from A’  to B”. Over time the capital 
reallocation shifts the short-run transformation curve progressively  to the 
left and the economy moves along the path indicated by the dashed line 
toward the new long-run equilibrium point G’  ’. Since the only departure 
from a full optimum during the adjustment period is the intersectoral 
rental differential and since this falls steadily as capital reallocates (as 
shown in panel [ii] of figure 3.1), it is intuitively obvious that the shortfall 
of national income below its long-run level declines monotonically during 
the adjustment period. (An algebraic proof of this is provided in appen- 
dix A.) 
The situation is very different when the wage rate is sticky, however. 
To begin with, the level of output of  good Y remains unchanged in the 
short run and the output of X  falls by more than it does when the wage is 
flexible. Hence the new short-run equilibrium point E“  lies on the same 
horizontal line as Ar  and to the left of  B“. Evaluated at the new world 
prices, the value of  national output must fall, but the change in real 
national income is ambiguous. Figure 3.6 illustrates the borderline case 53  Capital Mobility, Wage Stickiness, and Adjustment Assistance 
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where real national income is unchanged-with  production at E”  con- 
sumers can just attain, at C,, the same social indifference curve they 
enjoyed, at C,,  before the price change. Hence the level of real income 
remains at OH.  But this is just a fortuitous occurrence, and, as noted by 
Haberler (1950), real income may either rise or fall due to the short-run 
wage rigidity. 
Over time, movements of  capital between sectors and adjustments of 
the wage rate lead the economy along the path E”G”,  but, unlike the 
full-employment case, this path need not exhibit any regular properties. 
Since, as seen in the last section, factor allocations and factor prices may 
follow cyclical paths, the same is true of output levels. Moreover, there is 
no guarantee that real income will rise monotonically during the adjust- 
ment period, which introduces the possibility of  “immiserizing realloca- 
tion,” by analogy with the phenomenon of immiserizing  growth, familiar 
from comparative-statics models. 
To see how immiserizing reallocation may occur, consider figure 3.7, 




and 2 of figure 3.7,  where excess supply of labor prevails, the dashed lines 
L,L1 and L2L2  parallel to the labor-market equilibrium locus represent 
given levels of employment, while the dotted lines represent given levels 
of  national income: these two sets of  loci differ since, except at the 
long-run equilibrium wage w* ,  the failure to equalize rentals between 
sectors lowers national income below the maximum attainable with a 
given level of employment. Hence along the solid line, which represents 
one possible path that the economy may follow starting at point a,  the 
level of employment falls between a  and 6, and to the left of 6 the level of 
income also falls. Thus immiserizing  reallocation takes place even though 
the direct  consequences of  each market’s adjusting in isolation-the 
reallocation of  capital toward the high-rental sector and the fall in the 
wage rate which tends to encourage a higher level of employment-tend 
to raise national income. These favorable effects are more than offset by 
the change in industry mix, whereby the declining labor-intensive sector 
(X) releases more labor than the expanding sector is willing to absorb. 
Immiserizing reallocation  cannot occur in  region 2, since here the 
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ment, and so all three effects tend to raise national income. However, it 
can occur in region 3, where national income is below its potential not 
because of unemployment but because marginal products of labor are not 
necessarily equalized between sectors due to the fact that one or both 
sectors are unable to realize their notional labor demands. Note that as a 
result it is not possible to determine the value of national income corre- 
sponding to a point in regions 3 and 4 from a knowledge of  that point’s 
(Kx,  w)  coordinates alone, for in addition it is necessary to specify what 
rationing rule is being used to allocate the scarce labor supply between 
the two sectors. One plausible assumption is that labor is allocated on a 
“first come, first served” basis, which implies that along the path segment 
(u only sector Xis  constrained, since at point 5 sector Y is unconstrained 
and its notional demand for labor falls steadily as its capital stock falls and 
the wage rate rises. In region 4, however, it is not possible to be so 
definite, since at some point the return flow of capital into sector Y must 
lead it to seek to expand its employment level. Hence along the segment 
of  the path above u in region 4 either or both sectors may face ration 
constraints on their labor demands. Moreover, as noted in section 3.3, 
the location of the boundary between regions 3 and 4 and so of the point u 
itself  also depends on the rationing rule  assumed. Fortunately  these 
considerations  do not  prevent  us  from  reaching definite conclusions 
about the qualitative behavior of  national income along the portions of 
the adjustment path in regions 3 and 4. In both regions when only one 
sector is constrained  a reallocation  of  capital toward the high-rental 
sector and a rise in the wage rate tend to raise national income, the latter 
because it induces the unconstrained sector to shed labor which can be 
absorbed by the rationed sector where its marginal product is higher. In 
region 3, however, the inflow of  capital into the labor-intensive sector 
increases the aggregate excess demand for labor, and so increases the gap 
between the marginal product of labor and the wage rate thus tending to 
lower national income. It is quite possible for this effect to dominate (as 
illustrated in figure 3.7 by  the fact that the path (u  crosses the dotted 
iso-income locus), so  leading once again to immiserizing reallocation. 
This cannot happen in region 4, since capital is now moving into the 
capital-intensive sector and so national  income unambiguously rises. 
However, immiserizing reallocation can still take place in region 4, if 
substantial excess demand for labor exists and if  the labor-rationing rule 
is such that both  sectors are constrained. (These  results are proved 
algebraically in appendix A.) 
In conclusion, therefore, the combination of sticky wages and sluggish 
intersectoral reallocation of  capital can lead to phases of  immiserizing 
reallocation, where, because of the combination of two sources of alloca- 
tive inefficiency, private decisions actually lower real national income. 
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and the proportion of the capital stock in use in the labor-intensive sector 
move in the same direction; however, it can also happen in region 4 if 
both sectors are rationed in their demands for labor. Notice finally that 
this has taken place in an environment with no permanent distortions in 
factor or commodity markets. Adding such distortions to the model 
would provide an additional, albeit well-known, source of  immiserizing 
reallocation. 
3.5  Policies toward the Adjustment Process 
Having examined the positive consequences of our assumptions about 
dynamic adjustment, we are now in a position to consider their implica- 
tions for public intervention in the adjustment process. 
Within the framework of  the present model, adjustment assistance 
could take many forms, which can be divided into two broad categories, 
static and dynamic subsidies. By static subsidies we mean subsidies which 
persist indefinitely at a constant rate, such as a permanent subsidy to 
capital in sector X.  Such a policy can clearly never be first-best provided 
the social discount rate is less than infinite, since it distorts the long-run 
equilibrium and thus ensures that maximum national income is never 
attained (although it is conceivable that if  this were the only form of 
intervention available, the short-term gains which it could make possible 
might outweigh its long-term costs). 
In  any  case, it  is probably  more  appropriate to reserve  the  term 
“adjustment assistance” for dynamic subsidies only. An explicit calcula- 
tion of  the optimal time paths of such subsidies in the model presented in 
earlier sections would require the solution of  an optimal control problem 
with two state variables (K,  and w)  and at least one control variable (the 
level of  tax or subsidy), and such an analysis is  unlikely to be very 
illuminating.* However,  a number  of  observations about the optimal 
form of  dynamic intervention can be made on the basis of  direct inspec- 
tion of  the competitive time path given in (15). First, given the formal 
structure of  the model, if the government has sufficient instruments at its 
disposal to simultaneously control  the speeds of  adjustment  in both 
markets (i.e., E+ and E,& and if  there are no constraints on its ability to 
finance these subsidies in a nondistorting way, then in principle it can 
bring the economy arbitrarily close to the first-best equilibrium instan- 
taneously and so can reduce adjustment costs arbitrarily close to zero. 
The optimal policy to support this first-best plan would imply a subsidy 
to capital movement in order to raise E+ and thus would speed up the 
process of capital reallocation. However, if  E,,  the speed of  adjustment 
of  wages, cannot be affected by  government policy, then the optimal 
second-best policy will in many cases imply a reduction in E+, in other 
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if  the competitive path implies a cyclical movement in factor prices and 
allocations, then some reduction in E+ will be sufficient to eliminate the 
cycles and so to lower the present value of  the transitional costs of 
adjustment. The second-best optimal dynamic subsidy is more likely to 
take this form the slower the speed of  adjustment of  wages (i.e., the 
smaller is E+) and the smaller the potential for factor substitution in 
either sector (i.e., the smaller is A). 
These considerations illustrate the importance of simultaneously con- 
sidering the adjustment process in both labor and capital markets in 
devising the appropriate form of adjustment assistance. At the same time 
the present model does not provide any microfoundations for the adjust- 
ment functions +  (*)  or JI (.),  and so implicitly assumes that these functions 
represent dynamic distortions rather than true social costs of adjustment. 
It is of  interest therefore to compare our conclusions with those of  two 
recent papers, by Lapan (1976) and Mussa (1978), which provide more 
complete analyses of the sources of sluggish adjustment in the labor and 
capital markets ,  respectively. 
Mussa’s model, which assumes continual full employment but provides 
an explicit microeconomic analysis of  the capital reallocation decision, 
has already been summarized in section 3.2.  One of his major conclusions 
is that if  capital owners’ expectations of the future course of factor prices 
are rational, then private decisions will coincide with the socially optimal 
plan and intervention will be unnecessary. However, this conclusion was 
derived from a model with no other distortions, static or dynamic, and so, 
from the general theory of  the second best, it need not survive their 
introduction. In particular, if  future wage rates, though perfectly fore- 
seen, do not reflect the social opportunity cost  of  labor, then  some 
interference with the competitive path of capital reallocation is likely to 
be justified. (That rational expectations need not emasculate discretion- 
ary macroeconomic policy if  wages and prices are sticky has been argued 
by Neary and Stiglitz 1982.) 
Where Mussa assumes continual full employment and concentrates on 
the capital reallocation decision, Lapan ignores the latter by assuming 
that capital is permanently  sector-specific and focuses instead on the 
labor market.  Unlike  the present paper,  he  assumes that  the labor 
markets in the two sectors are segmented, with migration between the 
two markets taking place in response to differences in sectoral unemploy- 
ment rates. Lapan shows that the optimal policy requires a wage subsidy 
to the declining sector at a rate which may or may not decline over time. 
As comments by Cassing and Ochs (1978) and Ray (1979) with replies by 
Lapan (1978, 1979) have made clear, intervention in this model is jus- 
tified by two different features: first, the assumption that due to “institu- 
tional” factors labor, though immobile, must be paid the same wage in 
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rate of  labor migration into the expanding sector to the unemployment 
rate in the declining sector decreases with the rate of  unemployment, 
reflecting (if unemployment is voluntary) the fact that congestion occurs 
in the search for new jobs. 
It is clear that all of these results are fully consistent with the theory of 
distortions and welfare, whose implications for static policy intervention 
in open economies have been surveyed by Bhagwati (1971) and Corden 
(1974). In a first-best world, with no distortions and with rational ex- 
pectations of future factor prices, the market is the best judge of the rate 
of intersectoral resource transfers. But once one of  these assumptions is 
abandoned, a case for adjustment assistance on purely efficiency grounds 
can be constructed. 
3.6  Summary and Conclusion 
This paper has examined the consequences of  appending transitional 
wage stickiness to  the two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin model of international 
trade theory,  concentrating  on  the  adjustment path  of  the economy 
following an exogenous fall in the price of  the labor-intensive import- 
competing sector. It was shown that in the absence of substantial perma- 
nent factor-market distortions the economy moves in a stable fashion 
toward  the new long-run equilibrium predicted  by  static Heckscher- 
Ohlin analysis. However, the combination of wage stickiness  and sluggish 
intersectoral capital movements implies an adjustment path with prop- 
erties very different from those exhibited by the full-employment short- 
run capital specificity adjustment path. In particular, factor prices, factor 
allocations, and output levels may exhibit cyclical paths as the economy 
alternates between  phases of  unemployment  and excess demand for 
labor. Moveover, these cycles in output levels may be reflected in cycles 
in the value of  national income, giving rise to phases of  “immiserizing 
reallocation” during which the presence of two separate dynamic distor- 
tions induces production and employment decisions which actually re- 
duce the level of national income. This phenomenon does not arise from 
any  perversity  in  the  assumed  adjustment processes:  capital  always 
moves toward the high-rental sector, and wages always rise or fall in 
response to excess demand for or supply of labor. Both of these processes 
tend of  themselves to raise national income (the rise in wages under 
excess demand for labor does so because it induces the sector which is not 
rationed on the labor market to release labor to the other sector, where 
its marginal product is higher.) Rather, immiserizing reallocation occurs 
because the accompanying change in industry mix may lead to either an 
increase in unemployment (when the labor-intensive sector contracts) or 
an intensification of  the aggregate excess demand for labor (when the 
labor-intensive sector expands), and each of these tends to lower national 
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The implications for government policy of these assumptions about the 
dynamic adjustment of  the economy were then examined. It was noted 
that as far as the formal structure of the present model is concerned the 
government could in principle ensure instantaneous adjustment if  it had 
access to two dynamic policy instruments and if  revenue could be raised 
costlessly to finance the disbursement of subsidies. Of course, such a high 
degree of controllability of the economy is clearly farfetched. If  either of 
these conditions  are not  met, then transitional  adjustment  costs are 
unavoidable, but some intervention may still be justified and will in many 
circumstances take the form of  subsidies designed to slow down rather 
than speed up the rate of  intersectoral capital reallocation. However, 
these conclusions are based on a model where the microeconomic under- 
pinnings of  sluggish wage adjustment and intersectoral capital realloca- 
tion were not specified. When this is done, as it is, for example, in the 
recent work of  Lapan (1976) and Mussa (1978), the key question be- 
comes whether there is a divergence between social and private costs of 
adjustment. Such a divergence can arise from any one of  a number of 
sources, including imperfect foresight on the part of capital owners of the 
future course of  factor prices, government- or trade-union-induced re- 
strictions on wage flexibility or labor mobility, and congestion in the 
process of  search for new jobs. 
While the likelihood that one if  not  all of  these sources of  market 
imperfection will be present in any particular situation suggests a pre- 
sumption in favor of  adjustment assistance, some strategic and political 
considerations should be kept in mind before recommending assistance in 
practice.  lo Principal among these are the related questions of the auton- 
omy of the policy agency concerned with administration of the assistance 
program, and the likelihood that the nature of  the dynamic distortions 
present may not be independent of the existence or expected duration of 
such a program. Moreover, since the terms on which assistance  is granted 
are likely to vary from case to case, there is a grave danger that the 
establishment of  an assistance program may lead to a diversion of  re- 
sources toward lobbying activities, or, in the terminology of  Hirschman 
(1970), to an increased used of “voice” as a means of postponing “exit.” 
(This is especially likely when declining industries are geographically 
concentrated  and  government  policies  restrict  interregional  labor 
mobility.) 
Finally, it should be recalled that we have concentrated in this paper on 
defenses of  adjustment assistance which rely on its raising  allocative 
efficiency in an environment where the revenue to finance subsidies can 
be raised costlessly. This neglects the well-known fact that, when nondis- 
torting revenue sources are unavailable, the optimal levels of any subsidy 
must be modified to reflect the by-product distortion costs of  revenue 
raising. In addition it ignores what is probably the strongest economic 
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ance-its  use as a redistributional tool in compensating factors tied to 
declining industries, and thus in  ensuring that  the gains from  trade 
liberalization do not accrue only to consumers and to factors employed in 
export industries. 
Appendix A  The Time Path of  National Income during 
the Adjustment Process 
Changes in real national income 2  at the prices prevailing after the initial 
change in the terms of  trade are a weighted average of  the changes in 
sectoral output levels, the weights being the share of  each sector in 
national income: 
(All  2 = 0,x + 0,Y. 
To evaluate this change, it is necessary to distinguish between cases 
where all firms are on their “notional” labor-demand schedules and those 
where they are not. Considering first the former cases, the change in 
output in each sector is a weighted average of the changes in input levels, 
the weights being the shares of  each factor in the value of  output: 
Substituting from (A2) into (Al), and using equation (12) to eliminate 
Ky,  yields 
This may be simplified by invoking the identities 
(A41  Bi€lIi = €+Ali  (i =  x,y), 
where 01 is the share of  wages in national income, and 
Equation (A3) thus becomes 
Since employment is demand-determined, the first bracketed term in 
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When full employment is maintained by wage flexibility, Ld  is constant, 
and so 
Z = 0,0h  [ 1 - 51  Kx. 
Since capital is assumed to be reallocated at all times toward the high- 
rental sector, (AS) confirms the assertion in section 3.4 that immiserizing 
reallocation  cannot  take  place  under  the full-employment .short-run 
capital specificity adjustment mechanism. 
When unemployment prevails, we may substitute from equation (13) 
into (A7) to obtain 
Hence, under excess supply of  labor, national income is raised by  a 
reallocation  of  capital  toward  the high-rental  sector  or by  a  rise in 
employment; and the latter in turn may be brought about by either a fall 
in wages or a reallocation of  capital toward the labor-intensive sector. 
Immiserizing reallocation can therefore occur when the expanding high- 
rental sector is relatively capital-intensive (as in region 1 of figure 3.7) but 
not when it is labor-intensive (as in region 2 of  figure 3.7). 
Comparing equations (A9) and (13), it may be noted that when excess 
supply of  labor prevails, iso-national-income and iso-employment loci 
are tangential in figure 3.7 when the capital market is in equilibrium. 
When the capital market is out of  equilibrium, the iso-national-income 
locus at a given point in (w,  Kx)  space is more steeply sloped than the 
iso-employment locus at the same point if  and only if  sector X  is the 
high-rental sector. 
We turn next to cases where excess demand for labor prevails, so that 
at least one sector is off its notional labor-demand schedule. If this is true 
of sector X,  then the levels of both labor and capital inputs are predeter- 
mined in the short run, and the first equation in (A2) must be replaced by 
(AW  8  =  GJX  + GhKx. 
The input elasticities of supply may now be interpreted as sectoral value 
shares evaluated not at market factor prices but at “virtual” factor prices, 
Ex and <, where the latter are the factor prices which would induce 
unconstrained  firms  to  behave  in  the  same  way  as  employment- 
constrained ones. Thus 62  J. Peter Neary 
We must now distinguish between three cases. 
a) Both sectors constrained: In this case neither sector is willing to 
relinquish any labor, so that sectoral employment levels are constant and 
hence the level of  national income is independent of  the wage rate. 
Substituting from (A10) and the corresponding equation for sector Y, 
and using (12) to eliminate Ky,  (Al) becomes 
-  Ah  1 
kY 
-  eyeky 4  K,. 
Invoking an equation similar to (A5), but in terms of virtual rather than 
actual rentals, this becomes 
-  z  = e,ekx [ 1 - 3  k,. 
Since there is no necessary relationship between the rankings of the two 
sectors by market rentals (which determine the direction of capital move- 
ment) and virtual rentals (which reflect the extent to which the sectors are 
forced  off  their  notional  labor-demand schedules),  it  is possible for 
immiserizing reallocation to take place in this case. 
b) Only sector X constrained: In this case the amount of  labor avail- 
able to sector X  is determined through the full-employment constraint, 
(A141 
by  sector  Y's  notional  labor-demand function  (11). Substituting into 
(A10) and making use of  (12) yields 
Alxi, +  AlyLy = 0, 
Note that an increase in the wage rate raises the output of X,  since it 
induces sector Y to release labor, so relaxing the labor-demand constraint 
on sector X.  Substituting from  (A2)  and  (A15) into  (Al) yields an 
expression which may be simplified by  invoking equations (A4) (for 
sector Y), (A5), and (A16): 
(Am  e,GlX w = elkLr  w,. 
Manipulation yields 63  Capital Mobility, Wage Stickiness, and Adjustment Assistance 
Since iFx exceeds w,  (A17) shows that immiserizing reallocation is possi- 
ble in this case when the high-rental sector is relatively labor-intensive 
(e.g., in region 3 of  figure 3.7). This is because, by contrast with (A9), 
national income is increased by a fall in the aggregate effective demand 
for labor when  excess demand for labor prevails, and such a fall is 
encouraged by either a rise in wages or a reallocation of labor toward the 
relatively capital-intensive sector. 
c) Only sector Y constrained. A similar series of  derivations yields in 
this case 
Appendix B  The Capital-Market Equilibrium Locus 
under Excess Demand for Labor 
When excess demand for labor prevails, the capital-market equilibrium 
locus is not given by equation (6),  since the assumption made in deriving 
that equation, namely, that the rental in each sector equals the marginal 
product of capital there, does not hold in a sector which is rationed in its 
demand for labor. Instead, the rental is simply the residual income per 
unit of capital accruing to the sector after wage payments are made. Thus, 
for sector X 
px -  wLx 
KX 
rx = 
Totally differentiating, holding p constant, and substituting from (A10) 
and (All) yields 
- 
ehtx = -  ek6 + 0k  {-tT-  WX  i)(Lx -  kx).  (A20) 
When firms in sector X  are on their notional labor-demand curves, this 
reduces to equation (4) in the text. However, when sector Xis  rationed in 
the labor market, Ex exceeds w,  implying that at a given market wage a 
fall in the sector’s capital-labor ratio (which represents a relaxation of the 
labor-demand constraint) raises the return to capital. 
In order to derive an expression for the capital-market equilibrium 
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a) Both sectors constrained. Combining (A20) with the corresponding 
equation for sector Y,  recalling that L, and L, are constant, and using 
(12) to eliminate ky  yields 
The coefficient of K, is zero in the neighborhood of  the long-run equilib- 
rium point, and is otherwise negative, implying that when both sectors 
are rationed, the capital-market equilibrium locus is downward-sloping  if 
and only if  sector X  is relatively labor-intensive. 
b) Only sector X constrained. In this case 
?x-?y  = 
Using (A12), (ll),  and (12) to eliminate i,,  this becomes 
--  01,  --[$-l]Kx.  1x1  - 
Okx  hlxhky 
A reallocation of capital toward sector X  has the direct effect of tighten- 
ing the labor-market constraint which the sector faces and thereby lower- 
ing the return to capital there; in addition, by inducing sector Y to release 
some labor, it indirectly tends to relax the constraint on sector X.  A 
necessary and sufficient condition for the direct effect to dominate is that 
sector Xbe  relatively labor-intensive. As for an increase in the wage rate, 
it has the usual effect of lowering the relative rental in the labor-intensive 
sector. In addition, by  encouraging sector Y to release some labor, it 
raises output and the return to capital in sector X. 
By inspecting (A23) it may be established that this locus is horizontal in 
the neighborhood of  long-run equilibrium and downward-sloping when 
the extent of  excess demand for labor is small. If  the labor market is 
extremely tight (so that W,  greatly exceeds w),  the locus is downward- 
sloping if  and only if  sector X  is relatively capital-intensive. 
c) Only sector Y constrained. A similar series of  derivations yields 65  Capital Mobility, Wage Stickiness, and Adjustment Assistance 
Notes 
1. Mussa (1979) illustrates the usefulness of  these isocost curves in international trade 
theory. 
2.  This criticism  of adjustment costs as a rationale for noninstantaneous  movement from 
one long-run equilibrium to another was first made by Rothschild (1971) in the context of 
investment theory. 
3.  These facts are reflected in the shape of  the transformation curve in the minimum- 
wage model of Brecher (1974). Note, however, that if  the wage is pegged at a level which 
implies excess demand for labor, then (as shown in appendix  B) the capital-market equilib- 
rium locus does depend on the intersectoral allocation of  capital, and so a determinate 
unspecialized equilibrium is possible. 
4. As shown by Jones and Neary (1979) this does not rule out a temporary reversal of the 
sign of  161  in the course of  the adjustment process. 
5. See Dixit (1978), for example. I am indebted to Avinash Dixit for pointing out the 
need to “Clowerize” the capital-market  equilibrium  locus under excess demand for labor in 
the present model. 
6.  Production would remain at A” if  both capital and labor were sector-specific  in the 
short-run but their returns in each sector were perfectly flexible, ensuring continual full 
employment of both factors. The consequences  of  these assumptions have been examined 
by  Kemp, Kimura, and Okuguchi (1977) and Neary (19786). 
7. Since real income is evaluated at post- rather than prechange prices, the measure of 
adjustment costs proposed here is of the compensating rather than the equivalent variation 
kind. The construction  of a true measure of adjustment costs is, of course, greatly facilitated 
by  the assumption that commodity prices are exogenous. The difficulties of  constructing 
measures of static efficiency losses in a closed economy are illustrated by Desai and Martin 
(1979). 
8.  The optimal policy under the minimum-time objective for the special case where 
techniques are fixed in both sectors (so that the competitive  solution  is as illustrated  in figure 
3.4) has been derived by  Koichi Hamada in a paper published in Japanese. 
9. Optimal policy choice in models with adjustment costs has also been examined by 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1976) and Mayer (1977). However, they were not concerned  with 
adjustment assistance. 
10. Wolf  (1979) presents a valuable survey of  actual experience with adjustment assist- 
ance and discusses some of  the issues touched on here. 
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Comment  Carlos Alfredo Rodriguez 
In Neary’s two-sector, two-factor, small-country  ,  open-economy model, 
the wage level adjusts slowly in response to the rate of unemployment 
while physical capital moves slowly between sectors in response to differ- 
ences in its marginal value product in each sector. Neary shows that in the 
resulting dynamic adjustment path, national income evaluated at world 
prices may actually fall for some time in spite of  the quite reasonable 
adjustment mechanism postulated for the factor markets and the absence 
of  distortions in the goods markets. This possibility is baptized “immis- 
erizing reallocation” (IR) by  the author and is, in my  view, the main 
contribution of  the paper.  However, I feel that the paper  does not 
provide a clear, intuitive explanation for the phenomenon of  IR, and 
doing so is the purpose of  this comment. 
Explaining Immiserizing Reallocation 
There are two state variables in the model: the wage rate, w,  and the 
capital used in sector X, K,,  (K,, equals the fixed total stock minus K,). 
According to Neary, IR may happen when w falls (so there must be 
unemployment) and K,  also falls (so that the marginal product of Kin Y 
exceeds that in the Xsector). Clearly, the fall in wages can only contrib- 
ute to a higher level of  employment and therefore will raise national 
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income (remember, there are no distortions in goods markets so that here 
cannot be any “adverse” Rybczynski effect); therefore the fall in wages 
cannot be the direct cause of IR,  which then must be the result of the shift 
of  capital between sectors in the face of  short-run wage rigidity. 
The question is how can shifting capital from a low- to a high-marginal- 
value product activity reduce national income in the absence of  distor- 
tions in the goods markets? The answer is that in a fixed wage economy, 
the marginal product of capital does not equal its social marginal product 
(i.e., the increase in national income due to a unit increase in the capital 
stock). In Neary’s world, because of the fixed wage assumption, the social 
opportunity cost of labor is zero since any increase in employment in one 
sector comes exclusively from the pool of  unemployment and not from 
reduced employment (and output) in the other sector. The social mar- 
ginal product of labor being zero implies that the social marginal product 
of  capital in each sector is equal to its average private product in the 
sector (this will be formally proved below). The criterion for IR therefore 
becomes that capital moves from a high average product activity to a low 
average product activity. Notice that it is perfectly possible for the sector 
with the higher average product of  capital to have the lower marginal 
product of capital. Since capital moves in response to differences between 
private rates of return (marginal products), the possibility of IR is there- 
fore explained as a result of the difference between the private and social 
rates of return to capital in each sector. To the extent that unemployment 
persists, the possibility of IR is eliminated when capitalists perceive the 
average product of capital as its opportunity cost and this can be obtained 
through  a subsidy to the use  of  capital in  each sector equal to the 
difference between its average and marginal product. This second-best 
subsidy will eliminate the possibility of IR but will not, of course, elimi- 
nate  the  social loss of  unemployment  due to the  wage rigidity, the 
solution to which would require subsidizing  labor by the full amount of its 
marginal product. 
I will now derive algebraically the above results. 
’  =  FL(Lx’  Kx)  demands for labor.  ‘  = GL(Ly,Ky) 
y = G (Ly,  Ky) 
= F(Lx7  Kx)  production functions. 
The functions F(.) and G (.)  are assumed to be homogeneous in the first 
degree so that 
(5)  FLL = -  (KJL)FKL, 69  Capital Mobility, Wage Stickiness, and Adjustment Assistance 
The capital constraint requires that 
(7)  K, + K~ = K, 
while there is no labor constraint since there is unemployment. 
(8) 
The phenomenon of IR can arise when capital is shifted away from the 
X  sector into the Y sector. The net effect on national income of  this 
capital reallocation is obtained by computing the derivative dZ/dKy  in (8) 
subject to the conditions (l),  (2), and (7). Differentiating (l),  (2), and (8) 
and using (7),  we obtain 
(8’) 
(1’)  dL,/dKy =  FKL/FLL = -(Lx/Kx)  (using [5]), 
(2’)  dLy/dKy  = GKL/GLL = -  (Ly/Ky)  (using [6]). 
The first two terms on the RHS of (8’)  represent the effect on national 
income of the reallocation of labor induced by the movement of capital; 
the last term in (8’) captures the direct effect of the reallocation of capital 
(which is positive since by assumption GK  exceeds FK). The possibility of 
IR requires therefore that the sum of the first two terms on the RHS of 
(8’) be sufficiently negative to offset the positive contribution of the last 
term  (GK -  FK). We can go one step further to see whether a more 
definite expression can be obtained. Replacing (1’)  and (2’) into (8’) 
using (1) and (2), we obtain 
National income, assuming world prices equal unity, is 
Z  = X  + Y = F(L,,  Kx)  + G(Ly,  Ky). 
dZ/dKy = (dL,/dK,)ti; + (dL,/dKy) 
+ (GK -  &)? 
(9)  dIldKy= -(FLL,lK,)  + (GLLy/Ky)  + GK-  FK= 
which, given the linear technology, becomes 
(10)  dZ/dKy = (Y/Ky)  -  (X/K,). 
According to (lo), shifting capital away from the X  sector into the Y 
sector will increase national income if  and only if the average product of 
capital in the Y sector exceeds the average product of  capital in the X 
sector. This result is totally independent of  the relationship between the 
marginal products of  capital in both sectors and, as explained before, is 
due to the fixed wage assumption. 70  J. Peter Neary 
Comment  Avinash Dixit 
This is a typically competent Neary paper on the specific factor model. 
The added feature is wage stickiness, which is shown to produce interest- 
ing new problems such as cyclical adjustment paths involving “immiseri- 
zing” phases where the value of  output may be falling. Like all fix-price 
models, this one could be criticized for its lack of  explicit attention to the 
process of  price formation. The ad hoc nature of  the capital allocation 
process could also be discussed. Neary is aware of  both problems, and 
would offer  the standard  replies.  Instead of  indulging in  this ritual, 
therefore, I shall point out how some of the technical aspects of the paper 
could be developed more neatly. Thus the discussion is an alternative 
version of  Neary’s appendix A. 
Instead of Neary’s A - 8 approach following Jones (19659, I shall use the 
revenue or national product function following Chipman (1972) and Dixit 
and Norman (1980). In the flexible-wage case, the matter is very simple. 
The value of  output is given by 
(1)  = R(p,,py,K,,Ky,L), 
where the function on the RHS gives the maximum of p,X +  pyY  subject 
to production feasibility given factor supplies K,, Ky,  and L.  The impor- 
tant property of this function for our purposes is that its partial deriva- 
tives with respect to K, and Ky  are the value marginal products of these 
factor quantities, i.e. ,  the rental rates r, and r,, in the respective sectors. 
Differentiating with respect to time, therefore, we have 
(2)  z = (a~/a~,)k,  + (a~/a~,)k~  = (r, -  ry)Kx 
using Ky  = -  K,.  Since K, has the same sign as (r, -  ry  ), national product 
increases monotonically along the adjustment path. 
When the sticky wage is below its full-employment level, labor must be 
rationed between the two sectors. Neary considers alternative cases and 
finds ambiguous answers. The nature of  this ambiguity is brought out 
most sharply by  considering a case where labor is allocated efficiently, 
i.e., so as to maximize the value of output. Now we once again have (l), 
but the partial derivatives of R with respect to K, and Ky  are the shadow 
rentals 7, and T,,.  Differentiating, 
The sign of  K, is that of  the difference between the market rental rates 
(r, -  ry).  There is no logical connection between this and the difference 
(3)  Z = (7, -ry)  K,. 
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between the shadow rental rates; therefore the immiserizing decrease in 
2  along the adjustment path is a possibility. 
When the sticky wage is too high, there is unemployment. In this 
case it is better to replace the revenue function by  the closely related 
profit  function  n(p,,py,K,,Ky,  w), this  being  the  maximum  of 
(pxX  +  pyY -  wL)  subject to feasibility  given (K,, Ky)  and the prices. Its 
partial derivatives with respect to K, and Ky  are the rentals r,  and ry,  while 
the labor demand function is minus the partial derivative with respect to 
w: 
(4) 
National product is then profit plus the wage bill: 
(5)  z=  nT(px,py,Kx,Ky,w)  + wLd(px,py,Kx,Ky,w). 
In the specific factor model, labor demand is found by equating the 
marginal product of  labor in each sector to the product wage there: 
(6)  WlPX =f:(L,/K,)  or Lx  = Kxgx(w/p,), 
wheref, is the production function in intensive form and g, is the function 
inverse to f:.  Similarly for the other sector. Therefore 
(7)  Ld(Px,Py,Kx,Ky,W)  = K,g,(w/p,) + Kygy(w/py). 
Using all this and differentiating (5),  we have 
i  = (r, -  ry>irx  + w~d,  i  + w[g,(w/p,> -  gy(w/pY)]kx. 
The first term is positive as before. The second term is also positive, since 
Ld, is negative, and in the region of  unemployment so is 6.  The only 
possible ambiguity arises from the third term. The term in brackets is the 
difference between the labor-capital ratios in the two sectors, which is 
positive by Neary’s assumption that sector X  is more labor-intensive. 
Therefore the third term will be positive when K, is positive, i.e., in 
Neary’s region (2). In that region, therefore, national pFoduct is increas- 
ing along the adjustment path. In region (l), however, K, is negative and 
so is the third term, and it is possible for it to outweigh the first two and 
thus produce an immiserizing decrease of  national product during the 
adjustment process. 
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